

**SUBDIVISION AND DEVELOPMENT APPEAL BOARD  
PARKLAND COUNTY**

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HEARING DATE: September 21, 2026

**Notice of Decision of Subdivision and Development Appeal Board**

**INTRODUCTION**

- [1] The Development Authority for Parkland County (the "County") issued a stop order on December 2, 2025 (the "Stop Order") under section 645 of the *Municipal Government Act*, RSA 2000, c M-26 ("MGA"). The Stop Order was issued to Mr. William M Cosgrove (the "Appellant") for Unauthorized Development at 28304 114 Ave Acheson, Alberta, legally described as NE-8-53-26-4 Lot 8, Plan 3632 RS (the "Lands").
- [2] On December 22, 2025, the Appellant appealed the Stop Order.
- [3] On February 9, 2026, the Board adjourned the hearing at the request of the Agent for the Appellant. The Board further adjourned the hearing on February 23, 2026, and then again on March 18, 2026, at the request of the Agent for the Appellant. The hearing was ultimately held on September 21, 2026.

**PRELIMINARY MATTERS**

**A. Board Members**

- [4] The Chair requested confirmation from all parties in attendance that there was no opposition to the composition of the Board hearing the appeal. None of the persons in attendance had any objection to the members of the Board hearing the appeal.

**B. Exhibits**

- [5] The Chair confirmed that everyone in attendance had the full hearing package prepared for the hearing. There were no additions or objections to the exhibits as presented. The Board marked the exhibits as set out at the end of this decision.

**C. Miscellaneous**

- [6] The appeal was filed in time, in accordance with section 686 of the MGA.

- [7] The Board is satisfied that it has jurisdiction to deal with this matter. There were no objections to the proposed hearing process. There were no preliminary matters raised at the beginning of the hearing.

## **DECISION OF THE SUBDIVISION AND DEVELOPMENT APPEAL BOARD**

- [8] The Board denies the appeal and upholds the Stop Order on the same conditions as set out in the Stop Order of December 2, 2025.

## **SUMMARY OF HEARING**

- [9] The following is a brief summary of the oral and written evidence submitted to the Board, and the arguments advanced by the parties. At the beginning of the hearing, the Board indicated that it had reviewed all the written submissions filed in advance of the hearing.

### **Development Authority**

- [10] The Lands are located at NE-8-53-26-W4, Lot 8, Plan 3632 RS and are municipally described as 28304 114 Ave, Acheson. The Lands are in a Business Industrial district and are bordered by Highway 16 to the north and 114 Avenue to the south.
- [11] On November 20, 2025, the County conducted a site inspection of the Lands. The site inspection revealed that there was development occurring on the Lands, including:
- a) the importation of approximately three feet of crush concrete across the site without geotechnical oversight, professional compaction verification, or clean fill verification;
  - b) an alteration of site grade by approximately 1.8 meters relative to the natural topography;
  - c) unauthorized drainage works;
  - d) environmental damage to an environmentally sensitive area; and
  - e) a fence was installed along the southwest, north, and east boundaries of the Lands without a development permit.
- [12] On December 2, 2025, Braden Slemko, on behalf of the Development Authority, issued a Stop Order.
- [13] The Stop Order states

*Specifically, the following unauthorized development was observed:*

*Extensive excavation, stripping, and grading of the Lands. This includes the removal of topsoil, the alteration of established drainage patterns, and the movement of earth materials.*

*This constitutes a contravention of Parkland County Land Use Bylaw 2025-12*

- [14] The Development Authority asserted that the Appellant does not have a development permit for the developments taking place on the Lands.
- [15] The Development Authority acknowledged that there are two historic development permits for the Lands: 16-D-104 ("DP104"); and 16-D-129 ("DP129"). However, a development permit is not valid unless any conditions of approval, except those of a continuing nature, have been met.
- With respect to DP 104, the observed development is outside the scope of the approved development. Further, the Appellant has not fulfilled the conditions of the permit, including unpaid levies and securities.
  - With respect to DP129, the observed development is outside the scope of the approved development, and the engineering and landscape conditions of the development permit were never satisfied. The observed development includes the storage of a large pile of crushed concrete in areas approved for the storage of sea cans, and truck and trailer parking. The observed development is also missing a storm pond, which was a critical feature of DP129. Further, the Appellant has not fulfilled the conditions of the permit, including unpaid securities.
- [16] Neither DP104, nor DP129 are mentioned in the Stop Order, but this does not mean that the Development Authority did not consider these legacy permits prior to issuing the Stop Order. On July 24, 2025, several months prior to the issuing of the Stop Order the County wrote to the Appellant following an inquiry about the validity of DP104. Following an analysis of the permit conditions, the County wrote "**Development Permit 16-D-104 is deemed to have expired and is no longer valid**" [emphasis in original]. The Appellant did not raise DP129 at the time of this exchange.
- [17] The Development Authority provided the Board with two maps, which overlay the development footprints contemplated by DP104 and DP 129 over of the current development on the Lands. The current development pattern does not align with the legacy footprints.
- [18] Section 616(b) of the MGA states that a "development" means an excavation or stockpile and the creation of either of them, among other things. Section 7.10.2.1 of the Parkland County Land Use Bylaw (the "LUB") states that "[a]ll Development requires a Development Permit, except for those listed in Section 7.20. Section 4.30.21 of the LUB states that "Excavation is a Discretionary Use and must require a Development Permit unless otherwise exempt under this [LUB]."

- [19] In response to the Appellant's arguments, the Development Authority argued:
- neither DP104, nor DP129 ever achieved legal validity;
  - a permit for "Aggregate Crushing" does not permit un-engineered "Engineering Operations";
  - changes to the development scope required written approval from the County, which written approval was never sought or provided; and
  - the unauthorized grade alterations and the failure to provide critical stormwater facilities negatively impact natural features, and pose a significant risk of localized flooding and potential damage to Alberta Transportation infrastructure.
- [20] The Development Authority argued that the Court of Appeal decision in *Legacy Inc. v Red Deer (City)*, 2018 ABCA 393 stands for the proposition that the Development Authority must discharge the legal or persuasive burden of proof to uphold the contested stop order. However, after the Development Authority has led evidence that would allow the Board to conclude that the Development Authority has provided its case, the burden shifts to the Appellant to introduce credible evidence that undermines the Development Authority's case. The Development Authority argued that there is nothing improper about requiring the Appellant to bear the evidentiary burden of demonstrating that the legacy permits are valid, or that the ongoing development is consistent with those legacy permits, after the Development Authority has provided evidence to establish the upholding of the Stop Order.
- [21] The Development Authority argued that the documents put forward by the Appellant are indicative of many municipal employees, including employees of other departments, trying to work with the Appellant over a significant amount of time. The County is pro-development, within the natural constraints on the Lands.
- [22] The Development Authority asked the Board to deny the appeal and uphold the Stop Order.

### **Appellant – William Cosgrove**

- [23] The Appellant was represented at the hearing, by his agent, Mr. Matt Feehan.
- [24] The Appellant argued that the Stop Order should be quashed because the activities described in the Stop Order are authorized by DP129, granted on April 18, 2016. DP129 authorizes aggregate crushing and sales and a discretionary use. There is no record of DP129 being cancelled, suspended or modified.
- [25] DP129 included a condition that "All drainage and grading improvements shall be in accordance with the drainage/grading plan Drawing No. SP 3615360.A1 by OPUS Steward Weir [the "OSW Plan"] (or the most recent revised version of this plan). The activities described in the Stop Order, excavation, stripping, grading, removal of topsoil, alteration of drainage patterns, and movement of earth materials are all activities contemplated under the OSW Plan for proper development of the Lands.

- [26] With respect to the condition regarding landscaping security in DP129, the Appellant stated that the County has never issued him an invoice. He would be willing to pay the security immediately.
- [27] The Appellant argued that the County is estopped from issuing the Stop Order. The Appellant met with Mr. Slemko from the County on June 30, 2025. The Appellant advised that he intended to continue with development and asked that the County put any objection in writing, with reasons, within 14 days. The Appellant did not receive a stop work order at that time and therefore the County is estopped from alleging the development was unauthorized.
- [28] Internal County emails acknowledge that DP129 was treated by the County as being in effect. On July 24, 2026, the County determined that DP104 was deemed to have expired. The County did not provide formal notice of this decision to the Appellant, the notice was by email only. The County failed to mention DP129 at that time.
- [29] The County was acting in bad faith by issuing the Stop Order despite prior knowledge of the development, and by failing to mention DP129 in the Stop Order itself.
- [30] In his Supplemental Written Submission, the Appellant raised four additional issues:
- whether the Development Authority has discharged its evidentiary burden;
  - the jurisdiction of the Board to hear certain arguments raised by the Development Authority;
  - whether the Development Authority has improperly referenced the current versions of the LUB, bylaws, Area Structure Plans, and Municipal Development Plan;
  - and whether the County breached the MGA.
- [31] The Appellant provided the Board with a substantial amount of information regarding the history of DP129, including issues around stormwater, wetland obligations, and highway interfaces. These issues were the subject of emails between the County, Alberta Environment and Parks, and Alberta Transportation. The Appellant provided all requested technical materials requested and responded promptly to each agency as necessary.
- [32] The Appellant acknowledged that the contested historical details are not elements of the MGA s. 645 test for Stop Orders, but argued that the background provides “helpful context about jurisdiction and process”. The background information explains why the Appellant acted as he did.
- [33] The Appellant requested the Stop Order be quashed.

### **Board Questions**

- [34] The Board asked the parties for clarification regarding the footprint of the ongoing development, as compared to the footprints contemplated in DP104 and DP129.

- [35] The Development Authority stated that the gravel crushing area has moved as time goes on and is now outside the area for that activity contemplated by D129 or D104. There is a large pile of concrete that has been stockpiled on the Lands, in the area designated for Sea Can Storage and Truck and Trailer Parking under DP129.
- [36] The Appellant disputed the boundaries of the approved aggregate crushing area on the maps provided by the County. He stated that the concrete was placed where it was in response to a County request to have the concrete relocated away from a residential development on the other side of Highway 16. The Appellant stated that the development is not finished yet, which is why the concrete is located outside the permitted area. Once the development is complete in its finished state, it will comply with the requirements of the permit.
- [37] The Board asked the parties how much time would be appropriate to give the Appellant to come into compliance, in the event that the Board decided to uphold the Stop Order.
- [38] The Development Authority stated that development on the site should stop immediately. The County would be willing to give additional time for the Appellant to come into compliance and apply for a new development permit.
- [39] The Appellant stated that the Lands cannot realistically be remediated at this point. The Appellant declined to answer the Board's question asserting that it would be prejudicial to his position to comment.

## **FINDINGS OF FACT**

- [40] The Lands are located at NE-8-53-26-4, Lot 8, Plan 3632 RS, municipally described as 28304 114 Ave, Acheson.
- [41] The Lands are in a Business Industrial district.
- [42] The Appellant who is subject to the Stop Order is an affected person.
- [43] On December 2, 2025, Braden Slemko, issued a Stop Order on William Cosgrove for unauthorized use of the Lands. The Stop Order was personally delivered to Mr. Cosgrove.
- [44] The Appellant is using the Lands in a manner for which he does not have a development permit.

## **REASONS**

### **Jurisdiction**

- [45] The Board's jurisdiction is found in section 687(3) of the MGA. The Board has the authority to confirm, vary or revoke the Stop Order or any condition attached to it.

**687(3)** In determining an appeal, the subdivision and development appeal board  
[...]  
(c) may confirm, revoke or vary the order, decision or development permit or any  
condition attached to any of them or make or substitute an order, decision or permit of  
its own  
[...]

[46] In making this decision, the Board considered the MGA, the LUB and the oral and written submissions provided by the Development Authority and the Appellant.

### **Affected Person**

[47] The Board finds that the Appellant is an affected person because he was the recipient of the Stop Order, and is therefore entitled to file the appeal.

### **Was the Stop Order Validly Issued?**

#### ***Technical Requirements***

[48] The first question the Board must address is whether the Stop Order was validly issued. The onus is on the Development Authority to establish that the Stop Order was valid (*Legacy Inc. v Red Deer (City)*, 2018 ABCA 393 at para 103).

[49] The Board considered whether the Stop Order met the technical requirements set out in Section 645 of the MGA. The Board notes that the Appellant did not contest that there was any breach of the technical requirements in the MGA; however, the Board must still be satisfied that the requirements for the Stop Order are met.

[50] A copy of the Stop Order was in evidence before the Board. The Stop Order includes the date it was issued (December 2, 2025). The Stop Order indicates that it was personally delivered to the Appellant. The Stop Order also states what must be done by the Appellant under the words "YOU ARE HEREBY ORDERED TO:". The Stop Order was signed by Braden Slemko, on behalf of the Development Authority, Parkland County.

[51] In light of this evidence, and noting that there was no argument or evidence to the contrary, the Board is satisfied that the Stop Order meets the requirements of the MGA.

#### ***Is there a Development Requiring a Permit?***

[52] The next issue before the Board is whether the Stop Order was validly issued for a breach of the MGA, LUB, development permit, or condition of subdivision.

[53] The contravention set out in the Stop Order notes the following unauthorized development:

“Extensive excavation, stripping, and grading of the Lands. This includes the removal of topsoil, the alteration of established drainage patterns, and the movement of earth material.”

[54] Both parties made submissions regarding other activities on the Lands, for example the installation of a fence along the boundaries of the Lands, and alleged environmental damage. The Board did not give any weight to submissions on matters that were not the subject of the Stop Order.

[55] The Board finds that a development is taking place on the Lands, and that the type of development requires a development permit. In reaching this conclusion, the Board notes that the Appellant did not contest that a development was taking place on the Lands, and that the type of development requires a permit.

[56] The Board considered the written evidence and photographs of the Development Authority, which describe the activities taking place on the lands, including the excavation of land and importation of approximately 3 feet of crushed concrete across the site, site grade alteration of approximately 1.8 meters relative to the natural topography, and the stockpiling of concrete. The Board finds that these activities constitute a development, according to the definition of development set out in section 616(b) of the MGA. The Board considered section 4.30 of the LUB, which describes the general requirements for stripping, filling, excavation, and grading. Section 4.30.2.1 states that “Excavation is a Discretionary Use and must require a Development Permit unless otherwise exempt under this Bylaw.” There was no evidence or argument that the development was subject to any exemption.

### ***The Evidentiary Burden***

[57] In written and oral argument, the Appellant took issue with both the Development Authority’s position regarding who bears the evidentiary burden, and whether the Development Authority had met that burden. Both parties drew the Board’s attention to paragraphs 103-104 of *Legacy Inc. v Red Deer (City)*, 2018 ABCA 393. The Board understands this case to stand for the proposition that the Development Authority must discharge the legal or persuasive burden of proof to uphold the contested stop order. The Appellant may then introduce evidence to undermine the Development Authority’s case.

[58] Applied in this case, the Board accepts that the Development Authority has the legal and persuasive burden of proof to first establish a breach of the MGA and LUB sufficient to uphold the Stop Order. For the reasons set out in the section above, the Board is satisfied that the Development Authority met this burden. It was then open to the Appellant to introduce evidence to challenge the Development Authority, which it did by introducing DP104 and DP129 into evidence and arguing that the ongoing development is permitted by and consistent with DP129. The Appellant’s evidence is consistent with the warning of the Court of Appeal in *Legacy Inc.*: an appellant who fails to introduce credible evidence risks “suffering the consequences of an adverse factual determination”.

### ***Is there a Permit for the Development on the lands?***

[59] The Appellant asserts that DP129 permits the development on the Lands. The Development Authority submits that DP129 is not valid because the conditions of approval have never been fulfilled. Specifically, the Development Authority asserts that the scope of the observed development is different than what was approved, and landscaping and engineering conditions were never satisfied. These two positions are irreconcilable and must be addressed by the Board.

[60] The Board finds that there is not a permit for the development undertaken by the Appellant. The Appellant has not discharged their burden to demonstrate that the development is permitted under DP129.

[61] In reaching this conclusion, the Board first considered the terms of DP129. DP129 was issued on April 22, 2016 and states in part:

YOUR APPLICATION FOR: Aggregate Crushing and Sales located at Lot 8, Plan 3632 RS Acheson Zone 1, NE-8-53-26-W4 Municipal Address 26408 TWP Rd 531A was considered by the Development Authority and approved subject to the following conditions: [...]

2. The applicant shall provide a landscaping plan and security in the amount of 100% of the cost estimate of the landscaping. The security shall be in the form of an irrevocable letter of credit, to ensure that the landscaping is provided, installed and maintained in accordance with Section 13 of Parkland County's Land Use Bylaw 20-2009. [...]

4. All development shall be landscaped in a manner to prevent any surface run-off onto adjacent properties. [...]

6. All drainage and grading improvements shall be in accordance with the drainage/grading plan Drawing No. SP3615360.A1 by OPUS Steward Weir (or the most recent revised version of this plan). [...]

9. The proposed development shall conform to the submitted plans and shall not be moved, altered or enlarged except where authorized or directed through this permit approval.

10. Any proposed changes shall first be submitted for review by the Development Authority. Any changes considered substantial or inconsistent with this approval, as determined by the Development Authority, may require separate development permit approval.

11. Failure to comply with the conditions of this permit may result in the permit being cancelled, suspended or modified. [...]

You are hereby authorized to commence the development outlined above on or after May 07, 2016, provided that all conditions of approval are complied with and no appeal is received. [...]

The development must be started and diligently pursued within twelve (12) months from the date of decision, unless otherwise specified on this development permit approval or in the condition of the development permit approval. If the authorized development is not commenced the approval ceases and this permit is deemed void, expired and without effect, unless [an] extension to this permit has been previously granted.

[62] In its September 10, 2026 submissions, the Development Authority provided a copy of DP129, along with three accompanying pages that formed part of the permit. The first page is a hand-drawn sketch of the Lands, which shows the aggregate crushing area in a triangular area towards the southern end of the Lands, next to a storm pond, and a "gravel sales office". The additional two pages are stamped engineering drawings of the "Proposed Land Use Plan" and "Site Drainage Outside Storage Yard".

[63] With respect to Condition 2, the Appellant's own evidence during the hearing was that he has not paid or provided any security to date, but that he was willing to pay immediately. DP129 states that development was authorized to commence "provided that all conditions of approval are complied with". The Appellant's failure to comply with Condition 2 means that he cannot rely on DP129 as the basis to authorize his current development. The Appellant's statement that he is now willing to pay or provide security to come into compliance with Condition 2 ten years after DP129 was issued, and after the Stop Order was issued does not assist him. The Appellant's argument that the County failed to issue him an invoice does not relieve him of his obligation to comply with the conditions of DP129 if he seeks to rely on it as the basis for the development.

[64] The Board also finds that the development footprint undertaken by the Appellant is inconsistent with the plans that were submitted and approved as part of DP129. The Appellant cannot rely on DP129 for a development that takes place outside the footprint of what was approved.

[65] The Board considered the overlay maps prepared by the Development Authority, and found them to be a helpful illustration of the difference between what development was contemplated in DP129 and DP104, and what development has occurred. The most obvious example of the discrepancy is the large stockpile of concrete located in areas identified as "Equipment Sales + Rentals" and "Sea Can Storage Area".

[66] If the Appellant required leeway to store materials or modify the boundaries of the development while working towards a "finished state", this was contemplated by conditions 9 and 10. Together, these conditions permit a change to the submitted plans upon notice and approval by the Development Authority. There is no evidence before the Board that the Appellant requested and expansion of the aggregate crushing area, or for the storage of concrete in areas approved for equipment sales and rentals, and sea can storage.

[67] The Board notes that the legal issue before the Board is whether to uphold or quash the Stop Order. Therefore, it is not necessary for the Board to determine whether the passage of time has rendered DP129 void, expired, or otherwise without effect. However, the passage of time was a factor for the Board in considering the Appellant's argument that the development is not in its "finished state", but would be in compliance with DP129 when development was

finished. The Board does not accept the Appellant's argument that the stockpiling of concrete outside the designated area is permitted by DP129. If the Board were to accept the Appellant's position, in the extreme the Appellant could use the Lands in any manner, under the auspice of working towards a "finished state".

### ***Other Arguments***

[68] The Appellant argued that the Development Authority was estopped from issuing a Stop Order, because the Appellant had informed the Development Authority that he intended to proceed with his development and given the Development Authority 14 days to respond with reasons. The Board rejects this argument.

[69] In planning matters, the doctrine of estoppel is intended to balance the rights and interests of the public and landowner. It would be unfair to allow the Appellant to avoid the limitations on a permit, or to act without a permit simply by asserting he was entitled to do so and setting a deadline to dispute. Fourteen days to respond was not a reasonable demand in light of the 10 year history of DP129, particularly since the Appellant's position with respect to which permit (DP104 and DP129) authorized the development was unclear at the time. "Owners cannot simply ignore limitations on permits". (*Sihota v Edmonton (City)*, 2013 ABCA 43 at para 15). The Appellant cannot estop the Development Authority from exercising its authority under section 645 by setting an arbitrary deadline for the municipality to act.

[70] The Appellant challenged the Board's jurisdiction to consider evidence and argument brought forward by the Development Authority. The Appellant wrote

"to the extent the County now seeks to expand the scope of its case to include allegations of permit condition violations, environmental damage, fencing concerns, or permit invalidity, those matter call outside the scope of the Stop Work Order, and therefore outside the Board's jurisdiction on this appeal."

[71] The Board accepts that its role on a Stop Order appeal is restricted. Both parties brought forward a significant amount of evidence that they argued was to inform the context of the appeal. As noted above, the Board did not give any weight to arguments that were outside the scope of the Stop Order. However, arguments regarding the validity of permit DP129 fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the Board, which must consider whether the development undertaken by the Appellant was permitted. The Appellant cannot rely on DP129 as the basis for the argument that the development is permitted, and at the same time insulate the conditions of DP129 from Board scrutiny on the basis of jurisdiction. The Appellant put the issue of DP129 before the Board; the Board has the jurisdiction to consider it.

[72] With respect to the Appellant's arguments regarding references to the LUB in the Development Authorities submissions, it is not necessary for the Board to resolve this issue. The Board is not tasked with determining whether DP129 was validly issued in 2016, or whether DP129 was, or is, inconsistent with the land use framework at the time it was issued. The question before the Board is whether there is a permit for the use of the Lands that is the subject of the Stop Order, which question is answered above.

[73] The Board gave no weight and makes no comments on the Appellants allegations of bad faith and breaches of the MGA by the Development Authority. These questions are beyond the scope of a Stop Order appeal.

[74] Finally, while not determinative of the appeal, the Board notes that there appears to have been a serious breakdown in communication between both parties. Based on the record before the Board, it appears that over the course of time both the Development Authority and the Appellant may have allowed matters to fall through the cracks. The Board hopes that following this decision, the parties will be able to work together to come to workable solution for development, which would be in the stated interests of both parties.

## **Remedy**

[75] The Board has found that there is a development on the Lands, and that there is no valid permit for that development. The Stop Order was issued for the unauthorized use of Lands. In light of these conclusions, and for the reasons set out above, the Board finds that the Stop Order was validly issued and upholds the Stop Order.

[76] Having upheld the Stop Order, the Board must assess whether it will extend the time for compliance, and if so, by how much. The Stop Order requires the Appellant to immediately cease the unauthorized development, and then either submit a complete Development Permit Application to Parkland County, or restore the Lands to their original pre-development condition.

[77] The Board asked both parties for submissions on the question of how much time was reasonable for compliance during the hearing. The Development Authority noted that provided that the unauthorized development stopped immediately, it was open to giving time to the Appellant to apply for a new development permit. The Appellant explicitly declined to provide response on the basis that it would prejudice his position.

[78] The Appellant is the party who would benefit from an extension of time to comply with the Stop Order. In the absence of a request for more time to comply or any submissions on this point by the Appellant, the Board declines to extend the time for compliance.

[79] The December 2, 2025 Stop Order is upheld.

[80] Issued this 5th day of October 2026 for the Parkland County Subdivision and Development Appeal Board.



Mitch Fix (Oct 5, 2026 13:43:07 MDT)

Mitch Fix, Chair

SUBDIVISION AND DEVELOPMENT APPEAL BOARD

*This decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeal of Alberta on a question of law or jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 688 of the Municipal Government Act, RSA 2000, c M-26.*

**APPENDIX "A"**  
**REPRESENTATIONS**

**PERSONS APPEARING**

|    |                                                            |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. | Braden Slemko, Development Authority                       |
| 2. | Arlan Delisle, Brownlee LLP, for the Development Authority |
| 3. | William Cosgrove, Appellant                                |
| 4. | Matt T. Feehan, Ogilvie LLP, for the Appellant             |

**APPENDIX "B"**  
**DOCUMENTS RECEIVED AND CONSIDERED BY THE SDAB:**

| Exhibits                          | Description                                            | Date               | Pages   |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------|
| September 21, 2026 Agenda Package |                                                        |                    |         |
| 1.                                | Agenda Coversheet                                      | September 21, 2026 | 1       |
| 2.                                | Table of Contents                                      | September 21, 2026 | 2       |
| 3.                                | SDAB Meeting Minutes                                   | July 20, 2026      | 3-6     |
| 4.                                | Notice of Appeal                                       | December 22, 2025  | 7-10    |
| 5.                                | Waiver Form                                            | January 7, 2026    | 11      |
| 6.                                | Stop Order                                             | December 2, 2025   | 12-14   |
| 7.                                | Notice of Hearing for February 9, 2026                 | January 7, 2026    | 15-18   |
| 8.                                | Submission of the Development Authority                | Undated            | 19-69   |
| 9.                                | Submission of the Appellant/Applicant/Agent            | Undated            | 70-141  |
| 10.                               | Request to Adjourn February 9, 2026 Hearing            | February 5, 2026   | 142-149 |
| 11.                               | Notice of Hearing for April 20, 2026                   | February 23, 2026  | 150     |
| 12.                               | Request to Adjourn April 20, 2026 Hearing              | March 5, 2026      | 151-153 |
| 13.                               | Notice of Preliminary Hearing for March 18, 2026       | March 13, 2026     | 154-155 |
| 14.                               | Notice of Hearing for September 21, 2026               | March 18, 2026     | 156     |
| 15.                               | Supplemental Submission of the Development Authority   | September 10, 2026 | 157-191 |
| 16.                               | Supplement Submission of the Appellant/Applicant/Agent | September 10, 2026 | 192-425 |